Cognitive Neuropsychiatry
February 27, 2018
Geoff Davies, Charlotte L. Rae, Sarah N. Garfinkel et al.
23 citations
People in the early stages of psychosis show a reduced ability to accurately evaluate their own perceptions, a metacognitive deficit. In a perceptual decision-making task, individuals with first-episode psychosis performed worse on metacognitive accuracy than healthy controls, even when their basic perceptual performance was accounted for. Grey matter volume was also reduced in the superior frontal gyrus, a brain region linked to metacognition. However, no direct relationship was found between grey matter volume and metacognitive accuracy, leaving the neural basis of this deficit unclear. These findings suggest that a specific problem in scrutinizing one's own perceptions may underlie later functional difficulties in schizophrenia.
Cognitive Neuropsychiatry
January 1, 2003
Konstantine K. Zakzanis, Donald A. Young, Zachariah Campbell
22 citations
Repeated recreational use of MDMA (Ecstasy) is linked to lasting impairments in explicit memory. In this study, 15 abstinent MDMA users and 17 matched controls completed tests of memory and vocabulary. MDMA users showed deficits in episodic prospective memory—remembering to perform future tasks—with medium to large differences on time-based and event-based subtests. The ability to recall a future appointment appeared related to how often and how many times MDMA had been used. Further research is needed to explore the neurological basis of these deficits, particularly the role of serotonin.
Cognitive Neuropsychiatry
January 1, 2022
Sam Wilkinson, Huw Green, Stephanie Hare et al.
8 citations
Philosophy contributes to hallucinations research in three distinct ways. Phenomenology provides a sophisticated, critical understanding of the lived experience of hallucinations. Philosophy of cognitive science enables big-picture theorizing, synthesis of ideas, and critical engagement with new paradigms. Philosophy of science and psychiatry raises theoretically informed questions about diagnosis and categorization. These contributions reflect philosophy's methodological variety and its relevance to hallucinations researchers.
Cognitive Neuropsychiatry
November 8, 2021
Emma Palmer‐cooper, Nicola Mcguire, Abigail C. Wright
6 citations
In non-clinical groups, unusual sensory experiences like those in Tulpamancy and ASMR communities are not linked to stronger metacognitive beliefs, but having multiple such experiences is associated with higher hallucination-proneness. Tulpamancers who also experience ASMR scored higher on hallucination-proneness than controls, while Tulpamancers reported lower endorsement of metacognitive beliefs. No differences emerged in delusion-proneness, self-reflection, or self-schemas across groups. Metacognition influences unusual experiences in non-clinical populations, and the relationship varies by group. Improving metacognition in clinical populations may help reduce distress tied to unusual sensory experiences.
Cognitive Neuropsychiatry
July 1, 2025
Francesco Scaramozzino, Ryan Mckay, Nicholas Furl
1 citation
Psychotic-like experiences are linked to overprecise signal discrimination and lower decision thresholds, which may bias perceptual inference toward false positive detections. In 191 participants completing a Random Dot Motion task, drift-diffusion models showed that hallucination- and delusion-like experiences were associated with increased drift rates, a measure of sensory precision. Hallucination-like experiences also predicted lower decision thresholds. On the beads task, psychotic-like experiences correlated with higher confidence ratings but not with reduced data-gathering. These findings suggest that overprecise signal discrimination and lower decision thresholds may contribute to anomalous experiences.
Cognitive Neuropsychiatry
January 1, 2014
P R Corlett, S V Canavan, L Nahum et al.
People who report high dream awareness show a more liberal acceptance bias on a reality-monitoring task, meaning they are more likely to mistake familiar but irrelevant information for current reality. This pattern resembles confabulatory memory errors seen after damage to the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, a brain region previously linked to dreaming. The findings suggest overlap in how dreams, imagination, and reality are perceived, with implications for understanding reality monitoring and psychosis.
Cognitive Neuropsychiatry
February 1, 1997
P Brugger, M Regard, T Landis
Autoscopic phenomena are experiences where a person perceives a duplicate of their own body. The scientific literature on these phenomena is scattered and uses inconsistent terminology. This article proposes a new classification scheme based on how these experiences feel to the person. It describes the main features of several types: autoscopic hallucinations, heautoscopy, the feeling of a presence, out-of-body experiences, and negative and inner forms. The article also explains why these phenomena should be distinguished from other conditions like reduplicative paramnesias and misidentification syndromes. Finally, it suggests that a concept called the neuromatrix could be a starting point for understanding the brain mechanisms behind these experiences.