A Mosquito Bite Against the Enactive Approach to Bodily Experiences
The Journal of Philosophy 2011 DOI: 10.5840/jphil2011108411 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 46 |
| Key points | Proposes an enactive account of tactile experience, arguing that bodily experiences are a domain of consciousness where enactive theses are less contested than in vision. The paper sets out an agenda for such a view and identifies conceptual and empirical difficulties it must face. |
Abstract
The enactive approach aims at providing a unified account of perceptual experiences in terms of bodily activities. Most enactive arguments come from the analysis of visual experiences (Noë, 2004), but there is one domain of consciousness where the enactive theses seem to be less controversial, namely, bodily experiences. After drawing the agenda for an enactive view of tactile experiences, I shall highlight the difficulties that it has to face, both conceptual and empirical.