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The experience of acting and the structure of consciousness.

Joshua Shepherd

The Journal of Philosophy August 1, 2017 DOI: 10.5840/jphil2017114829 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Citations 26
Key points Argues that the experience of acting integrates agentive and perceptual aspects, making conscious action both an engagement with and an intimate acquaintance with the world.

Abstract

I offer an account of the experience of acting that demonstrates how agentive aspects of experience associated with the execution of intentions are richly integrated with perceptual aspects associated with parts of action taking place in the publicly observable world. On the view I elucidate, the experience of acting is often both an engagement with the world and a type of intimate acquaintance with it. In conscious action the agent consciously intervenes in the world and consciously experiences the world she is changing. In section one, I discuss extant accounts of the experience of acting, noting deficiencies. In sections two and three, I develop my own account, drawing on Casey O’Callaghan’s work on multi-modal perception. In the conclusion, I discuss ramifications for psychology and philosophy.

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