Schizophrenia Bulletin
March 15, 2023
Chi C Chan, Raquel Norel, Carla Agurto et al.
22 citations
Disturbances in self-experience are a central feature of schizophrenia and its study can enhance phenomenological understanding and inform mechanisms underlying clinical symptoms. Self-experience involves the sense of self-presence, of being the subject of one's own experiences and agent of one's own actions, and of being distinct from others. Self-experience is traditionally assessed by manual...
Frontiers in Psychology
October 14, 2021
Paul H Lysaker, Ilanit Hasson‐Ohayon, Courtney N. Wiesepape et al.
15 citations
Many with psychosis experience substantial difficulties forming and maintaining social bonds leading to persistent social alienation and a lack of a sense of membership in a larger community. While it is clear that social impairments in psychosis cannot be fully explained by symptoms or other traditional features of psychosis, the antecedents of disturbances in social function remain poorly...
BMC Psychiatry
July 2, 2021
Paul H Lysaker, S. Cheli, Giancarlo Dimaggio et al.
Research using the integrated model of metacognition has suggested that the construct of metacognition could quantify the spectrum of activities that, if impaired, might cause many of the subjective disturbances found in psychosis. Research on social cognition and mentalizing in psychosis, however, has also pointed to underlying deficits in how persons make sense of their experience of...
Frontiers in Psychology
March 25, 2020
Ilanit Hasson‐Ohayon, Andrew Gumley, H. Mcleod et al.
As research on metacognition has progressed a significant array of definitions, methodologies and therapeutic applications have emerged. Some of this work has primarily framed metacognition as an activity carried out by one person in order to know, monitor, and adjust their beliefs, memories, and behaviors. Accordingly, problems with metacognition have often been characterized as issues related...
Psychopathology
2019
Paul H Lysaker, Giancarlo Dimaggio, Jay A Hamm et al.
Disturbances in first person experience is a broadly noted feature of schizophrenia, which cannot be reduced to the expression of psychopathology. Yet, though categorically linked with profound suffering, these disturbances are often ignored by most contemporary treatment models. In this paper, we present a model, which suggests that deficits in metacognition and their later resolution...
Psychosis
October 2, 2018
J. Hamm, Bethany L. Leonhardt, Jeremy M. Ridenour et al.
24 citations
ABSTRACT Reductionist models of schizophrenia and psychosis have been criticized for neglecting first person experiences of these conditions. In response, at least two distinct bodies of research have emerged which study first person experience: philosophical phenomenology and approaches linked with the recovery movement. Phenomenological writings have produced a conceptual model of...