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Sensorimotor and Enactive Approaches to Consciousness

Erik Myin, Victor Loughlin

March 15, 2018 DOI: 10.4324/9781315676982-16 (opens in new tab)

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Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper
Citations 14
Key points Argues that a specific construal of the sensorimotor approach to consciousness can rebut the criticism that invoking the environment deepens rather than overcomes the philosophical problem of consciousness. It situates this within Mind-Life Continuity Enactivism, which holds that consciousness occurs only where the organization of life is present, and notes that sensorimotor theorists reject representations proposed as explanations of consciousness.

Abstract

This chapter discusses the sensorimotor thesis that experience is something we do, and explores how it helps to deal with the philosophical problem of consciousness. In Mind-Life Continuity (MLC) Enactivism, it has been argued that consciousness can occur only when and where the organization of life is present. "Enactivism" is a term that encompasses a wide variety of approaches to mind and experience. These various approaches all share the view that action and interaction are at the basis of all (human and animal) mentality. The chapter shows how construal of the sensorimotor approach to consciousness can be used to reject the criticism often made against sensorimotor theory, namely that by invoking the environment in its account of consciousness, the sensorimotor theory deepens, rather than overcomes, the philosophical problem of consciousness. Sensorimotor theorists reject representations when they are proposed to explain consciousness.

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