Revolution in Mind?
Evolving Enactivism May 19, 2017 DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262036115.003.0001 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that the E-turn in cognitive science, particularly REC's proposal, is revolutionary in its departure from classical cognitivist commitments to representationalism, computationalism, and mechanistic explanation. |
Abstract
This chapter introduces the E-turn in cognitive science –the move to embrace enactive, embodied, extended and ecological views of cognition–and the empirical and theoretical considerations that spurred it on. It explains how E-approaches differ from classical forms of cognitivism: in particular the degree to which different E-approaches move away from the cognitivist commitments to representationalism, computationalism and mechanistic explanation. Against this backdrop, it becomes clear in which ways REC’s proposal is not just radically revisionary but revolutionary in spirit. The chapter also sets out the basic rules of naturalistic play, reminding the reader why attempts to dismiss REC by appeal to a priori intuitions about what is essential to cognition violate the methodological scruples of naturalism.