Review of Egan F. Deflating Mental Representation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 192, 2025.
Roberto Horácio de Sá Pereira, Victor Machado Barcellos
Manuscrito August 12, 2025 DOI: 10.1590/0100-6045.2025.v48n4.rv (opens in new tab) via DOAJ
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractA review of Frances Egan's book argues that mental representation should be understood in a deflationary way: ascriptions of content to mental states are pragmatic tools that aid explanation, not claims about substantive representational relations. Egan contends that content attribution functions as a "gloss" across scientific, everyday, and philosophical contexts, avoiding metaphysical commitments. The review notes that while this approach resolves longstanding debates, it faces tensions regarding how to individuate mental states and the role of the external environment. The book's originality and its contributions to cognitive science and philosophy of mind are highlighted.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Review Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Deflating Mental Representation Frances egan |
| Key finding | Egan argues that ascriptions of content to mental states are pragmatically grounded explanatory tools, not reflections of substantive representational relations. |
Abstract
Abstract This review critically examines Frances Egan’s Deflating Mental Representation (MIT Press, 2025), a seminal work in the philosophy of mind that challenges traditional conceptions of mental representation and intentionality. Egan argues for a deflationary account wherein ascriptions of content to mental states are pragmatically grounded and serve primarily as explanatory tools, rather than reflecting substantive representational relations. The book navigates scientific, everyday, and philosophical contexts, showing how content attribution functions as a “gloss” that aids explanation without committing to metaphysical assumptions about representation. While Egan’s approach offers solutions to long-standing debates, it also faces critical tensions regarding the individuation of mental states and the role of the external environment. This review highlights both the originality and the philosophical challenges of Egan’s position, underscoring the book’s contribution to ongoing debates in cognitive science and the philosophy of mind.