Abstract Integrated information theory (IIT) makes two predictions about the role of inactive neurons in consciousness. According to the silent brain (SB) prediction, rendering all active neurons inactive (“silent”) in the physical substrate of consciousness (the “main complex”) does not eliminate the presence of consciousness, because the neurons are still able to spike. According to the...
Abstract Lopes (2021) has argued against my use of neural networks and dynamical systems theory in neurophenomenology. Responding to his argument provides an opportunity to articulate a pluralist approach to neurophenomenology, according to which multiple theoretical frameworks—symbolic, dynamical systems, connectionist, etc.—can be used to study consciousness and its relationship to neural...
I show how the dynamics of consciousness can be formally derived from the "open dynamics" of neural activity, and develop a mathematical framework for neuro-phenomenological investigation. I describe the space of possible brain states, the space of possible conscious states, and a "supervenience function" linking them. I show how this framework can be used to associate phenomenological...