Abstract The phenomenological concept of minimal selfhood (understood as the pre-reflective dimension of ‘for-me-ness’ or ‘mineness’ that is constitutive of the first-personal character of experience) is often treated as so formal and abstract that it remains neutral regarding embodiment. This paper challenges that view through a neurophenomenological approach that circulates between empirical...
Abstract Predictive processing is an increasingly popular explanatory framework developed within cognitive neuroscience. It conceives of the brain as a prediction machine that tries to minimise prediction error. Predictive processing has also been employed to explain aspects of conscious experience. In this paper, I critically evaluate current predictive processing approaches to the...
The context for our paper comes from the neurophenomenology (NPh) research programme initiated by Francisco Varela at the end of the 1990s. Varela's working hypothesis was that, to be successful, a consciousness research programme must progress by relating first-person phenomenological accounts of the structure of experience and their third-person counterparts in neuroscience through "mutual...
Abstract Time plays a significant role in science and everyday life. Despite being experienced as a continuous flow, computational models of consciousness are typically restricted to a sequential temporal structure. This difference poses a serious challenge for computational phenomenology—a novel field combining phenomenology and computational modelling. By analysing the temporal structure of...