Slow oscillations in the brain’s parietal cortex during urethane anesthesia differ fundamentally from those during natural non-REM sleep in mice, despite appearing similar on the surface. Differences are evident in the local field potential, the underlying current sources, and the modulation of unit activity. The data show that slow network oscillations in natural sleep and anesthesia are generated by different mechanisms, challenging the assumption that anesthesia reliably models sleep-related brain activity. This work highlights that phenomenological similarities can mask distinct neural processes, with implications for using anesthesia as a model for sleep and consciousness studies.
An interdisciplinary group of experts argues that progress in understanding and treating neuro-psychiatric disorders requires an integrative, multi-perspective approach that acknowledges differences between system levels, their complex interactions, and domain-specific languages. They review the past decade and find that many research programs remain reductionist and fail to critically examine neurobiological explanations and interdisciplinary interfaces. They call for establishing an interdisciplinary neurophilosophy that develops a critical philosophical stance within neuroscience, applying complex systems science to integrate knowledge. An ecological perspective is needed, viewing the brain as a regulative organ in a situated organism extended to tools, technologies, and social structures. The debate about free will illustrates that respecting complexity and irreducibility of mental phenomena avoids inappropriate reductionist and deterministic assumptions.
Some plant scientists propose that plants are cognitive and conscious, but this remains a minority view. The authors summarize arguments against plant consciousness and critique a 2020 article by Calvo, Baluska, and Trewavas that cites Integrated Information Theory (IIT) as supporting plant consciousness. The critique argues that IIT does not restrict consciousness to living organisms and can apply to nonliving systems, undermining the claim. The authors conclude that IIT cannot prove plant consciousness, for which there is no empirical evidence or support from neuron-based theories of consciousness.