5 papers in the library · 1 citation · publishing 2024-2026
Frontiers in Psychology 2026 Robert Worden
Many theories of consciousness propose that consciousness arises from neural computation in the brain. All information in a neural computer is physically encoded, but consciousness contains un-encoded information about local space. The information required for decoding does not reside in the brain. So consciousness cannot arise from encoded neural information; but it could arise from un-encoded...
arXiv Preprint Archive September 27, 2025 Robert Worden
Theories of consciousness depend on data, and it needs to be appropriate data, without overwhelming confounding factors. The reports of Minimal Phenomenal Experience (MPE) in [Metzinger 2024] relate to consciousness in a state purer than everyday consciousness, which may have fewer confounding factors. This essay suggests that the confounding factors, which are absent or diminished in MPE...
Neuroscience of Consciousness 2025 Robert Worden 1 citation
This paper uses simple arguments to derive a negative conclusion: that a computer cannot be conscious. If the brain is only a neural computer, brains cannot be conscious. Consciousness implies that there is something else happening in the brain, besides computation. In a running computer, information about outside events is encoded, to enable physical computation. The information required to...
arXiv Preprint Archive July 25, 2024 Robert Worden
It has been proposed that there is a wave excitation in animal brains, whose function is to represent three-dimensional space around the animal as a working spatial memory. After surveying the evidence supporting the hypothesis, I discuss ways in which it can be tested. There are many ways to investigate it, theoretically and experimentally. They include connectome studies, computational...
arXiv Preprint Archive May 20, 2024 Robert Worden
Neural theories of consciousness face three difficulties: (1) The selection problem: how are those neurons which cause consciousness selected, from all the other neurons which do not? (2) the precision problem: how do neurons hold a detailed internal model of 3D space, as the origin of our spatial conscious experience? and (3) the decoding problem: how are the many distorted neural...