Physicalism: Chauvinism and Pluralism
Gerald Vision
The MIT Press eBooks July 29, 2011 DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262015844.003.0007 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that chauvinism and pluralism offer distinct theories of phenomenal consciousness, with chauvinism requiring human-like constitution and pluralism allowing diverse constitutions. Proposes that the distinction is clarified through representative versions by McLaughlin and Kim, and notes the presumption that pain is identical to a neural property in familiar creatures. |
Abstract
This chapter tackles the theories that identify conscious properties and physical types. Specifically, it highlights the differences between chauvinism and pluralism. While chauvinists regard that the exclusive basis for having or ascribing phenomenal consciousness lies in the possession of a constitution approximating that of humans, pluralists tolerate differently constituted creatures as potential possessors of varying types of phenomenal consciousness. This chapter draws from representative versions of each position; McLaughlin’s for chauvinism and Kim’s for pluralism. The distinction between chauvinism and pluralism is not always apparent, but the use of these representative versions clearly demarcates these. This chapter also presents the presumption that the property of being in pain, at least for familiar creatures, is identical with a neural property.