Why Reject a Sensory Imagery Theory of Control Consciousness?
Topics in Cognitive Science April 1, 2011 DOI: 10.1111/j.1756-8765.2011.01136.x (opens in new tab)
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractA motor theory of control consciousness holds that nonsensory states, such as motor commands, directly contribute to the awareness of being in control of one's actions, contrary to a sensory imagery theory that denies such a role. Mandik (2010) defends this motor theory and argues it is preferable to Prinz's (2007) sensory imagery theory. This paper contends that Mandik's criticisms of Prinz's theory fall short, yet still finds reasons to favor the motor theory over the sensory imagery theory. The argument suggests that nonsensory states play a direct role in generating control consciousness.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key finding | Argues that Mandik's criticisms of Prinz's sensory imagery theory fall short, but that a motor theory of control consciousness is still preferable to a sensory imagery theory. |
Abstract
Abstract Mandik (2010) defends a motor theory of control consciousness according to which nonsensory states, like motor commands, directly contribute to the awareness we have of ourselves as being in control of our actions. Along the way, he argues that his theory is to be preferred over Prinz’s (2007) sensory imagery theory, which denies that nonsensory states play any direct role in the generation of control consciousness. I argue that Mandik’s criticisms of Prinz’s theory fall short, but that nonetheless there are reasons to favor a motor theory of control consciousness over a sensory imagery theory.