This chapter presents Armstrong’s last paper on philosophy of mind, where he recounts the origins of David Lewis’s seminal paper ‘An Argument for the Identity Theory’ which appeared in 1966, two years before Armstrong’s book. Armstrong situates Lewis’s theory in relation to his own theory and in so doing adds an important seam to the familiar narrative of how the causal theory of mind emerged...
AbstractBlock's distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness is accepted, and it is agreed that one may be found without the other, but his account of the distinction is challenged. Phenomenal consciousness is perceptual consciousness, and it is a matter of gaining information of a detailed, nonverbal sort about the subject's body and environment. Access consciousness is good,...
Searle tells us little about consciousness itself. He emphasizes its subjective and intentional character, although at the same time he asserts that is no more than a 'higher-order' neurophysiological feature. But for the purposes of his paper he treats consciousness more or less as a primitive. In fact, however, the word can be taken in a wider or narrower way. It can be taken to involve no...