Searles's Neo-Cartesian Theory of Consciousness
D. M. Armstrong
Philosophical Issues 1991 DOI: 10.2307/1522924 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Commentary Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 2 |
| Key points | Argues that Searle's account treats consciousness as a primitive and neglects distinctions among senses of the term: mere mental functioning, being awake, and being awake with some degree of introspective awareness of one's current mental processes. |
Abstract
Searle tells us little about consciousness itself. He emphasizes its subjective and intentional character, although at the same time he asserts that is no more than a 'higher-order' neurophysiological feature. But for the purposes of his paper he treats consciousness more or less as a primitive. In fact, however, the word can be taken in a wider or narrower way. It can be taken to involve no more than mental functioning, the sort of thing that a totally unconscious person or animal lacks. It can also be taken, as Brian O'Shaugnessy takes it in his excellent paper in this volume, to involve a person or animal being awake. Or, finally, it can be taken to involve not only being awake but, in addition, being in some degree introspectively aware of one's current mental processes. Searle does not enter into these matters in his paper.