6 papers in the library · publishing 2000-2018
The Bodily Self March 9, 2018 José Luis Bermúdez
We are embodied, and we are aware of our bodies ‘from the inside’ through different forms of bodily awareness. But what is the relation between these two facts? Are these forms of bodily awareness types of self-consciousness, on a par, say, with introspection? In this paper I argue that bodily awareness is a basic form of self-consciousness, through which perceiving agents are directly...
The Bodily Self March 9, 2018 José Luis Bermúdez
Taking as point of departure a paradox (the paradox of self-consciousness) that appears to block philosophical elucidation of self-consciousness, this paper illustrates how highly conceptual forms of self-consciousness emerge from a rich foundation of nonconceptual forms of self-awareness. Attention is paid in particular to the primitive forms of nonconceptual self-consciousness manifested in...
The Bodily Self March 9, 2018 José Luis Bermúdez
There is an interesting dialectic between discussions of bodily awareness in the phenomenological tradition and in contemporary philosophy of mind and scientific psychology. It shows, with particular reference to Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception, how phenomenological insights into bodily awareness and its role in agency can be developed and illuminated by research into somatic...
The Bodily Self March 9, 2018 José Luis Bermúdez
Fredérique de Vignemont has argued that there is a positive quale of bodily ownership. She thinks that tactile and other forms of somatosensory phenomenology incorporate a distinctive feeling of myness and takes issue with my defense in Bermúdez of a deflationary approach to bodily ownership. That paper proposed an argument deriving from Elizabeth Anscombe’s various discussions of what she...
Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science January 15, 2006 José Luis Bermúdez
AbstractSelf‐consciousness is deeply implicated in many aspects of cognition. To be self‐conscious is to be aware of oneself through information that one cannot fail to recognize is about oneself.
Behavioral and Brain Sciences April 1, 2000 José Luis Bermúdez
Rolls defends a higher-order thought theory of phenomenal consciousness, mapping the distinction between conscious and non-conscious states onto a distinction between two types of action and corresponding neural pathways. Only one type of action involves higher-order thought and consequently consciousness. This account of consciousness has implausible consequences for the nature of...