Bodily Ownership, Bodily Awareness, and Knowledge without Observation
The Bodily Self March 9, 2018 DOI: 10.7551/mitpress/9780262037501.003.0008 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that de Vignemont's objections to a deflationary account of bodily ownership miss the mark, and that her appeal to the Rubber Hand Illusion does not establish a positive quale of "myness" in somatosensory experience. Proposes that bodily awareness can be distinguished from ordinary perceptual awareness without positing a distinctive feeling of ownership. |
Abstract
Fredérique de Vignemont has argued that there is a positive quale of bodily ownership. She thinks that tactile and other forms of somatosensory phenomenology incorporate a distinctive feeling of myness and takes issue with my defense in Bermúdez of a deflationary approach to bodily ownership. That paper proposed an argument deriving from Elizabeth Anscombe’s various discussions of what she terms knowledge without observation. De Vignemont is not convinced and appeals to the Rubber Hand Illusion to undercut my appeal to Anscombe. Section 1 of this article restates the case against the putative quale of ownership. Section 2 explains why de Vignemonts’ objections miss the mark. Section 3 discusses in more detail how to draw a principled distinction between bodily awareness and ordinary perceptual awareness.