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Consciousness, higher-order thought, and stimulus reinforcement

José Luis Bermúdez

Behavioral and Brain Sciences April 1, 2000 DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x00252424 (opens in new tab)

Study at a glance

AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Key points Argues that a higher-order thought theory of phenomenal consciousness, which maps consciousness onto a specific type of action and neural pathway, has implausible consequences for stimulus-reinforcement learning.

Abstract

Rolls defends a higher-order thought theory of phenomenal consciousness, mapping the distinction between conscious and non-conscious states onto a distinction between two types of action and corresponding neural pathways. Only one type of action involves higher-order thought and consequently consciousness. This account of consciousness has implausible consequences for the nature of stimulus-reinforcement learning.