2 papers in the library · 87 citations · publishing 2008-2023
Self-Experience February 2, 2023 Robert J. Howell
AbstractIn this chapter, I argue that subjective character, if it is phenomenologically substantial, conflicts with the transparency of perceptual experience. More specifically, if subjective character accompanies all conscious states, then it should exist in unreflective perceptual states. These states, however, appear transparent and there is no room for self-referential phenomenology on the...
Australasian Journal of Philosophy November 21, 2008 Robert J. Howell 87 citations
A purely metaphysical formulation of physicalism is surprisingly elusive. One popular slogan is, ‘There is nothing over and above the physical’. Problems with this arise on two fronts. First, it is difficult to explain what makes a property ‘physical’ without appealing to the methodology of physics or to particular ways in which properties are known. This obviously introduces epistemic features...