Two theories of consciousness are compared for their ability to explain various qualia experiences, including meta-awareness, meta-cognition, the placebo effect, out-of-body experiences, cognitive therapy, and meditation-induced brain changes. One theory holds that qualia arise from specific neural patterns; the other posits that qualia result from the interaction of a proto-consciousness with brain activity. The comparison aims to determine which theory better accounts for these phenomena and offers a more promising research agenda.
This essay argues that, given current science, some first-person descriptions of experience cannot be reduced to third-person neural or psychophysiological measurements. When analyzing the contents of qualia—the subjective qualities of experience—these first-person accounts are the only relevant information. For many phenomena, such reports are the sole reliable source, and knowing their neural or psychophysical correlates adds no further insight into the experiences themselves.
The concept of consciousness and the mind-brain relationship, known as the 'hard problem,' remain unresolved, involving both science and philosophy with deep epistemological implications. The debate on the foundations of consciousness science contains philosophical biases related to the adopted paradigm and axioms, and the logical contradiction between monism and dualism. These biases originated largely from Descartes' thinking and the birth of modern sciences as a compromise with the Inquisition, persisting through the Enlightenment and Positivism. A proper investigation of consciousness and subjectivity requires reflection on the paradigm of scientific medicine to identify flaws and overcome the limits of the mechanistic-reductionist approach.