On the primacy and irreducible nature of first-person versus third-person information.
Patrizio Tressoldi, Enrico Facco, Daniela Lucangeli
F1000Research January 1, 2017 DOI: 10.12688/f1000research.10752.3 (opens in new tab) via PubMed
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractThis essay argues that, given current science, some first-person descriptions of experience cannot be reduced to third-person neural or psychophysiological measurements. When analyzing the contents of qualia—the subjective qualities of experience—these first-person accounts are the only relevant information. For many phenomena, such reports are the sole reliable source, and knowing their neural or psychophysical correlates adds no further insight into the experiences themselves.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Consciousness First-person Mind-brain relationship Third-person |
| Key finding | Argues that first-person accounts are the only reliable source for analyzing qualia contents and that neural correlates do not provide additional information about them. |
Abstract
In this essay, we will support the claim that at the current level of scientific advancement a) some first-person accounts cannot be reduced to their third-person neural and psychophysiological correlates and b) that these first-person accounts are the only information to reckon when it is necessary to analyse qualia contents. Consequently, for many phenomena, first-person accounts are the only reliable source of information available and the knowledge of their neural and psychophysical correlates don't offer any additional information about them.