3 papers in the library · publishing 2007
Beyond Reduction October 1, 2007 Steven Horst
AbstractThis chapter outlines the contemporary conversation in philosophy of mind. Reductionists claim the mind can or must be reducible to natural phenomena. Eliminativists claim the mind cannot be so reduced and that this implies that our mentalistic categories should be eliminated in favor of a more naturalistic vocabulary. Dualists point to an explanatory gap between mind and nature and...
Beyond Reduction October 1, 2007 Steven Horst
AbstractThis chapter examines several varieties of “naturalism” in philosophy of mind and philosophy of science. In philosophy of mind, it is the view that mental phenomena can be accommodated within the framework of the world of the nature as understood by the natural sciences. However, there are a number of variations on this view. Naturalism takes normative and positive forms. It can be a...
October 1, 2007 Steven Horst
AbstractContemporary debates in philosophy of mind‐between reductionists, dualists, nonreductive materialists, and eliminativists‐have been based upon the perception that mental phenomena like consciousness and intentionality are uniquely irreducible. The “explanatory gap” between mind and body seems to be an urgent and fascinating problem if one assumes that intertheoretic reductions are the...