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Thomas Natsoulas

33 papers in the library · 70 citations · publishing 1984-2006

Papers

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The Stream of Consciousness: VI. Relevancies from Imagination, Cognition and Personality

Imagination Cognition and Personality September 1, 1994 Thomas Natsoulas 9 citations

Quite naturally, Imagination, Cognition and Personality is the literal context of the present series of articles, which aims to examine what is known and knowledgeably held about the nature and character of the referents of William James's concept of the stream of consciousness. The sixth and seventh installments focus on selected relevant interpretations and facts from Imagination, Cognition...

The Stream of Consciousness: V. William James's Change of View

Imagination Cognition and Personality June 1, 1994 Thomas Natsoulas 17 citations

This is the fifth in a series of articles that compile and critically spell out what is known or knowledgeably held about the stream of consciousness. Discussed here are two aspects of James's conception: 1) the kind of mental-occurrence instance that is the stream's basic durational component, and 2) the change in James's explicit account of the temporal structure of the stream, from The...

The Stream of Consciousness: IV. Adolf Grünbaum's Atomicity

Imagination Cognition and Personality March 1, 1994 Thomas Natsoulas 11 citations

I devote most of the present article, which is the fourth in a series concerning the nature and characteristics of William James's stream of consciousness, to an examination of Adolf Grünbaum's case for the stream's atomicity. For this purpose, I use the lens provided by the objection that auditory perceptual experience of a continuous sound of unchanging pitch does not exhibit a discrete,...

The Stream of Consciousness: III. Adolf Grünbaum's Nowness

Imagination, Cognition and Personality September 1, 1993 Thomas Natsoulas

Implicitly and later explicitly, James understood the stream of consciousness to consist of a sequence of temporally adjacent pulses of consciousness (except for time gaps when consciousness stops). Gibson claimed James's stream amounts to a stream of self-consciousness since it includes “a travelling moment of present time.” Reference to the present, according to Gibson, depends on the...

The Stream of Consciousness: II. William James's Specious Present

Imagination, Cognition and Personality June 1, 1993 Thomas Natsoulas

In this second article of a series that examines from various perspectives the phenomenon that James called “the stream of consciousness,” I continue to argue that James's implicit account of the stream was not consistent with how he advertised it in The Principles. James's stream was more analogous to a train, with tightly adjacent successive components, than to a stream of water. Additional...

The Stream of Consciousness: I. William James's Pulses

Imagination, Cognition and Personality September 1, 1992 Thomas Natsoulas

It is argued here that William James's famous stream of consciousness, as he addressed it in The Principles of Psychology, is not after all analogous to a stream or river of water, but rather it consists of a succession of discrete instances or states of consciousness. Already in 1890, James had implicitly arrived at his later explicit conception of consciousness as made up of individual...

The Six Basic Concepts of Consciousness and William James's Stream of Thought

Imagination, Cognition and Personality June 1, 1987 Thomas Natsoulas

The present article utilizes the six basic concepts of consciousness for the purpose of clarifying the nature and characteristics of William James's stream of awareness. Simultaneously, an effort is made to render these concepts more understandable as referring to different properties and kinds of properties of a single basic phenomenon. Thus, a second purpose of this article is implicitly to...

Concerning the Unity of Consciousness: Part I. Varieties of Conscious Unity

Imagination, Cognition and Personality June 1, 1984 Thomas Natsoulas

Everyone agrees on one thing about consciousness—it possesses some sort of unity. Theorists of consciousness do not always give the same account of what this property amounts to, or of that from which they believe unity derives. In the present article, the unity of consciousness is discussed with reference to authors who have given to it some, larger or smaller, quantity of theoretical...