Of the states that constitute William James's stream of consciousness, many are or include perceptual mental acts. These states present to consciousness one or more of their environmental objects themselves, as distinct from a mere internal representation of the latter. That is, a feature of the contents of such states is that their objects have phenomenological perceptual presence....
As part of his rediscovery of consciousness, Searle has recently provided an interpretation of Freud's account of consciousness, including the relation of consciousness to nonconscious mental occurrences [i.e., preconscious mental occurrences and unconscious (repressed) mental occurrences]. Regrettably, Searle's interpretation is based on a single paragraph from The Unconscious and serves to...
If, as Gibson last proposed, we become aware (in the introspective attitude during visual perceiving) of the seen-now and the seen-from-here as such, there must occur not only outer awareness of these surfaces, but also a kind of inner awareness of certain of their experiential effects upon us. From Gibson's perspective, this conclusion would seem to mean that his ecological account must...