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The Stream of Consciousness: III. Adolf Grünbaum's Nowness

Thomas Natsoulas

Imagination, Cognition and Personality September 1, 1993 DOI: 10.2190/lqb0-c94b-6xm5-u9hw (opens in new tab)

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Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Key points The author argues that Gibson's claim that James's stream of consciousness is a stream of self-consciousness, because it includes a "travelling moment of present time," is close to James's own view of the specious present. Against Grünbaum's requirement that awareness of an event's "occurring now" needs conceptualized awareness of perceptual experience, the author asks whether perceptual experience itself can intrinsically involve the attribute of nowness.

Abstract

Implicitly and later explicitly, James understood the stream of consciousness to consist of a sequence of temporally adjacent pulses of consciousness (except for time gaps when consciousness stops). Gibson claimed James's stream amounts to a stream of self-consciousness since it includes “a travelling moment of present time.” Reference to the present, according to Gibson, depends on the occurrence of an introspective kind of perceptual experience; that is, it does not occur if only straightforward perceptual experience is going on. Actually, this is not far from James's own view of the specious present, as I have explicated it. Grünbaum would add that the “occurring now” of a physical event requires that the individual have perceptual experience of the event together with a conceptualized awareness of this perceptual experience as occurring simultaneously with the conceptualized awareness of it. But, I ask, cannot perceptual experience itself intrinsically involve the attribute of nowness?

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