Neuroscience of Consciousness
2025
Elise G Rowe, Ken Takeda, Masafumi Oizumi et al.
Top-down attentional amplification is often assumed to affect 'what' we see, that is, the contents of conscious experience. Previously, this claim has been examined by studies that manipulated attention and characterized conscious perception in binary categorical labels (e.g. seen versus unseen). However, these categorical judgments are not powerful enough to characterize the quality of...
Neuroscience of Consciousness
2020
Matthew J Davidson, Irene L Graafsma, Naotsugu Tsuchiya et al.
Perceptual filling-in (PFI) occurs when a physically present visual target disappears from conscious perception, with its location filled-in by the surrounding visual background. These perceptual changes are complete, near instantaneous, and can occur for multiple separate locations simultaneously. Here, we show that contrasting neural activity during the presence or absence of multi-target PFI...
bioRxiv Preprint Server
August 7, 2019
Matthew J Davidson, Irene L Graafsma, Naotsugu Tsuchiya et al.
preprint
Perceptual filling-in (PFI) occurs when a physically-present visual target disappears from conscious perception, with its location filled in by the surrounding visual background. Compared to other visual illusions, these perceptual changes are crisp and simple, and can occur for multiple spatially-separated targets simultaneously. Contrasting neural activity during the presence or absence of...
Science
January 25, 2018
Olivia Carter, Jakob Hohwy, Jeroen J A Van Boxtel et al.
86 citations
In their Review “What is consciousness, and could machines have it?” (27 October 2017, p. [486][1]), S. Dehaene et al. argue that the science of consciousness indicates that we are not on the verge of creating conscious machines. However, Dehaene et al. ask and answer the wrong questions. To
Advances in Consciousness Research
June 17, 2015
Jeroen J A Van Boxtel, Naotsugu Tsuchiya
11 citations
In this chapter, we discuss possible confounds that need to be carefully controlled for when the neural constitution of phenomenal conscious perception is studied. First, we discuss previous psychological or neural studies that clearly dissociated confounding factors (in particular, attention, report and memory) from phenomenal consciousness. We discuss several important phenomena and...
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
April 27, 2010
Jeroen J A Van Boxtel, Naotsugu Tsuchiya, Christof Koch
176 citations
The brain's ability to handle sensory information is influenced by both selective attention and consciousness. There is no consensus on the exact relationship between these two processes and whether they are distinct. So far, no experiment has simultaneously manipulated both. We carried out a full factorial 2 x 2 study of the simultaneous influences of attention and consciousness (as assayed by...
Frontiers in Psychology
2010
Jeroen J A Van Boxtel, Naotsugu Tsuchiya, Christof Koch
Recent research has slowly corroded a belief that selective attention and consciousness are so tightly entangled that they cannot be individually examined. In this review, we summarize psychophysical and neurophysiological evidence for a dissociation between top-down attention and consciousness. The evidence includes recent findings that show subjects can attend to perceptually invisible...