July 27, 1995
Thomas Nagel
1 citation
Abstract Although it does not solve the mind-body problem, this is a valuable and interesting book. Dennett begins with the accurate observation that no one would find the identity theory plausible if it were not for the unpalatability of the alternatives. As he puts it, the motive for identification is to avoid antic bulge. If there really are mental phenomena, they must be either identical or...
Philosophy
July 1, 1995
Howard A. Robinson
Objectivity, Simulation and the Unity of Consciousness: current issues in the philosophy of mind ed.Christopher Peacocke Oxford University Press,Proceedings of the British Academy, vol.83,1994, 162 + xxvi, £14.95 - Volume 70 Issue 273
Advances in Consciousness Research
June 29, 1995
Ralph D. Ellis
Questioning Consciousness brings together neuroscientific, psychological and phenomenological research, combining in a readable format recent developments in image research and neurology. It reassesses the mind-body relation and research on 'mental models', abstract concept formation, and acquisition of logical and apparently 'imageless' inference skills. It is argued that to be conscious of an...
The Journal of Alternative and Complementary Medicine
June 1, 1995
Kenneth G Walton, Nirmal D. Pugh, Paul Gelderloos et al.
161 citations
Our objective was to identify endocrine-related mechanisms capable of mediating preventive effects of stress reduction in hypertensive heart disease. Since beneficial effects of stress reduction accrue over time, this cross-sectional, descriptive study sought differences between healthy students not practicing a systematic technique for reducing stress (the average stress, or AS, group, n = 33)...
Behavioral and Brain Sciences
June 1, 1995
Joseph Levine
AbstractBasically agreeing with Block regarding the need for a distinction between P- and A-consciousness, I characterize the problem somewhat diflerently, relating it more directly to the explanatory gap. I also speculate on the relation between the two forms of consciousness, arguing that some notion of access is essentially involved in phenomenal experience.
Behavioral and Brain Sciences
June 1, 1995
Leonard Katz
4 citations
Abstract One can share Block's aim of distinguishing “phenomenal” experience from cognitive function and agree with much in his views, yet hold that the inclusion of representational content within phenomenal content, if only in certain spatial cases, obscures this distinction. It may also exclude some modular theories, although it is interestingly suggestive of what may be the limits of the...
Cambridge University Press eBooks
May 26, 1995
David Woodruff Smith
35 citations
THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM IN HUSSERL Husserl is often read as an idealist, more like Kant than Berkeley, or else as a dualist, with epistemological motivations like those of Descartes. It would be only fitting for Husserl then to set aside the physical world and study pure consciousness. Phenomenology, the science of consciousness, would become the whole of philosophy. However, when we look closely...
The Philosophical Review
April 1, 1995
Frances Egan
171 citations
The dominant program in cognitive psychology since the demise of behaviorism in the 1960s has been computationalism. Computational theories treat human cognitive processes as a species of information processing, and the systems that implement such processing as symbol-manipulating systems. Describing a device as a symbol manipulator implies that it is possible to treat some of its internal...
Bioethics
April 1, 1995
Jeff McMahan
The dominant conception of brain death as the death of the whole brain constitutes an unstable compromise between the view that a person ceases to exist when she irreversibly loses the capacity for consciousness and the view that a human organism dies only when it ceases to function in an integrated way. I argue that no single criterion of death captures the importance we attribute both to the...
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
March 1, 1995
Brian Garrett, John R Searle
5 citations
As one would expect, John Searle's latest book The Rediscovery of the Mind, is a daring and controversial work. It is a blunt and lively book, as is exhibited by the title that didn't make it: What's wrong with the Philosophy of Mind? Searle's long term goal is to bring consciousness back to center stage in the philosophy of mind from the rather marginal position it currently occupies in...