Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America
June 18, 2013
John R Searle
We do not have an adequate theory of consciousness. Both dualism and materialism are mistaken because they deny consciousness is part of the physical world. False claims include (i) behaviorism, (ii) computationalism, (iii) epiphenomenalism, (iv) the readiness potential, (v) subjectivity, and (vi) materialism. Ontological subjectivity does not preclude epistemic objectivity. Observer relative...
Journal of physiology, Paris
2007
John R Searle
The problem of consciousness should eventually receive a scientific solution, but there are a number of scientific and philosophical obstacles along the way. I offer solutions to the philosophical problems and proposals for approaching the scientific problems.
Mind A Brief Introduction
November 1, 2004
John R Searle
Abstract We ended the last chapter with an apparent contradiction of the sort that is typical in philosophy. On the one hand we accept a view that seems overwhelmingly convincing—the universe is material—but that seems inconsistent with another view that we cannot give up—minds exist. This pattern occurs over and over in philosophy. We will see in chapter 7 that the free-will problem exhibits...
Mind A Brief Introduction
November 1, 2004
John R Searle
Abstract The aim of this book is to introduce the reader to the philosophy of mind. I have three objectives. First, the reader should get an understanding of the most important contemporary issues and discussions in this field, and also get some understanding of their historical background. Second, I want to make clear what I think is the correct way to approach these problems, and I even hope...
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
March 1, 1995
Brian Garrett, John R. Searle
5 citations
As one would expect, John Searle's latest book The Rediscovery of the Mind, is a daring and controversial work. It is a blunt and lively book, as is exhibited by the title that didn't make it: What's wrong with the Philosophy of Mind? Searle's long term goal is to bring consciousness back to center stage in the philosophy of mind from the rather marginal position it currently occupies in...
Behavioral and Brain Sciences
December 1, 1990
John R Searle
AbstractCognitive science typically postulates unconscious mental phenomena, computational or otherwise, to explain cognitive capacities. The mental phenomena in question are supposed to be inaccessible in principle to consciousness. I try to show that this is a mistake, because all unconscious intentionality must be accessible in principle to consciousness; we have no notion of intrinsic...