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Neuropsychoanalysis July 2, 2020 Jason W. Brown
ABSTRACT This paper is a contribution to a theory of duration and subjective time in dream and waking consciousness. According to microgenetic theory, an act of thought begins, Wittgenstein wrote, and psychoanalysts would agree, as would I, with instinct as the animal inheritance traverses the evolutionary core of the brain, the drives arousing acquired experience and knowledge. These strands...
Electronic Visualisation and the Arts London Conference July 1, 2020 C. Smith
This paper attempts to redefine Double Consciousness (DC) as a framework through a number of emerging application areas, including: i) Living in Virtual Reality, ii) Dream Hacking and iii) DMTx Technology. The following questions will be used to frame the investigation: What are the opportunities that these application areas offer in terms of living in parallel? What are the corresponding...
June 30, 2020 Lucy Adams, P. Bourke
Approximately half the population have experienced a lucid dream. Yet, it is not well understood how an individual realises they are dreaming (i.e. lucid insight). A few studies suggest it can be triggered by a nightmare, or by the identification of inconsistencies/dream-like qualities/peculiarities. The present study aimed to produce a detailed typology of lucidity triggers to inform...
Current Biology June 22, 2020 Matthieu Koroma, Célia Lacaux, Thomas Andrillon et al. 34 citations
Sleep leads to a disconnection from the external world. Even when sleepers regain consciousness during rapid eye movement (REM) sleep, little, if any, external information is incorporated into dream content [1-3]. While gating mechanisms might be at play to avoid interference on dreaming activity [4], a total disconnection from an ever-changing environment may prevent the sleeper from promptly...
PsyArXiv May 25, 2020 Alexey Chizhik preprint
This paper presents a method that allows a patient to distinguish whether a current experience is dreamt or real. The method is based on mathematical analysis of complex data that are generated by an external object (for instance, a computer or another person). High complexity of the data and possibility to quantitatively analyze it allow one to unambiguously disentangle dream‐reality...
Consciousness and Cognition May 1, 2020 Emma Chabani, Marie Charlotte Vionnet, Romy Beauté et al.
At the extreme spectrum of consciousness during sleep, some patients with rare hypersomnias reported experiencing a specific night 'blackout' when sleeping, i.e., an absence of experiences or recall of them from sleep onset to offset. Thus, we explored through questionnaires the conscious experiences (dreaming experience, mind, self) during the night in 133 patients with idiopathic hypersomnia,...
Frontiers in Psychology April 22, 2020 Dalena van Heugten-van der Kloet, Steven Jay Lynn 15 citations
OPINION article Front. Psychol., 22 April 2020Sec. Consciousness Research Volume 11 - 2020 | https://doi.org/10.3389/fpsyg.2020.00745
Anesthesiology April 2020 Jesus J Ballesteros, Pamela Huang, Shaun R Patel et al.
Ketamine is a noncompetitive N-methyl-D-aspartate antagonist and is known for unique electrophysiologic profiles in electroencephalography. However, the mechanisms of ketamine-induced unconsciousness are not clearly understood. The authors have investigated neuronal dynamics of ketamine-induced loss and return of consciousness and how multisensory processing is modified in the primate...
Philosophy Compass April 1, 2020 Jennifer Windt
Abstract Sleep is phenomenologically rich, teeming with different kinds of conscious thought and experience. Dreaming is the most prominent example, but there is more to conscious experience in sleep than dreaming. Especially in non‐rapid eye movement sleep, conscious experience, sometimes dreamful, sometimes dreamless, also alternates with a loss of consciousness. Yet while dreaming has become...
Philosophy and the Mind Sciences March 24, 2020 Miguel Ángel Sebastián
It is often claimed that a minimal form of self-awareness is constitutive of our conscious experience. Some have considered that such a claim is plausible for our ordinary experiences but false when considered unrestrictedly on the basis of the empirical evidence from altered states. In this paper I want to reject such a reasoning. This requires, first, a proper understanding of a minimal form...