Spontaneity Without Rationality: A Kantian Approach to Self-Consciousness and Perceptual Content
Hannah Ginsborg
Perceptual Knowledge and Self-Awareness December 26, 2024 DOI: 10.1093/9780191965210.003.0013 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Kantian spontaneity can exist without rational agency, because consciousness of spontaneity is consciousness of normative constraint in thinking, and small children's sorting behaviour shows that one can be conscious of normative constraint without recognizing reasons. Proposes a less demanding but still Kantian conception of self-consciousness that allows small children to be self-conscious. |
Abstract
Abstract: A number of philosophers, inspired by Kant’s view of self-consciousness as consciousness of spontaneity, have understood self-consciousness as requiring rational agency with respect to one’s beliefs and desires. This leads to a demanding conception of self-consciousness, which excludes the ascription of self-consciousness to children who are too young to appreciate reasons. I offer an interpretation of the role of spontaneity in perceptual experience which suggests that there can be spontaneity, in Kant’s sense, without rational agency. The consciousness of spontaneity, on my reading of Kant is the consciousness of normative constraint in one’s thinking, and, as I argue through consideration of sorting behaviour in small children, one can be conscious of normative constraint without recognizing reasons. This leads to a less demanding, but still recognizably Kantian, conception of self-consciousness, one which accommodates the idea that small children can be self-conscious.