Kant on Consciousness and Self-Consciousness
The Oxford Handbook of Kant October 22, 2024 DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780198854586.013.12 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that a sound understanding of Kant's views on the nature of consciousness is a precondition for making sense of his claims about self-consciousness, and that understanding the relation between the two is crucial to appreciating what is distinctive in his theory of cognition. The essay also examines whether non-rational animals have consciousness and how Kant's views bear on contemporary debates. |
Abstract
Abstract Kant’s views on the nature and importance of self-consciousness have been extensively discussed, but his remarks about the nature of consciousness have received less attention. The present essay argues that a sound understanding of the latter topic is a precondition for making sense of Kant’s claims about self-consciousness, and that an understanding of the relation between these two topics is crucial to an appreciation of what is distinctive in his theory of cognition. Questions addressed include: why cognition requires consciousness, whether non-rational animals have consciousness, how the unity of consciousness is related to the capacity for apperception, and how Kant’s views on consciousness bear on contemporary debates about the nature and function of consciousness.