Sartre, Kant, and the spontaneity of mind
Dimitris Apostolopoulos
European Journal of Philosophy August 15, 2023 DOI: 10.1111/ejop.12885 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 4 |
| Key points | Argues that Sartre's Transcendence of the Ego draws on Kant's theory of spontaneity to support its metaphysical and phenomenological account of consciousness, and that this reading both illuminates Sartre's early relation to Kant and equips him to answer objections about self-consciousness and freedom. |
Abstract
Abstract I argue that Sartre's Transcendence of the Ego draws on Kant's theory of spontaneity to articulate its metaphysical account of consciousness's mode of being, to defend its phenomenological description of the intentional structure of self‐consciousness, and to diagnose the errors that motivate views of consciousness qua person or substance. In addition to highlighting an overlooked dimension of Sartre's early relation to Kant, this interpretation offers a fresh account of how Sartre's argument for the primacy of pre‐personal consciousness works, and brings the extent of his proximity to idealist models of mind into greater relief. It also affords Sartre the resources to respond to criticisms that his account of self‐consciousness relies on a spurious distinction and that his view of freedom cannot explain how consciousness is conditioned by its world.