Bodily Self-Awareness and Agency
Phenomenology and the Norms of Perception June 20, 2024 DOI: 10.1093/9780191993527.003.0003 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that the phenomenological model of perception, which treats norm-responsiveness as bodily and action-guiding rather than as a conceptual capacity for epistemic justification, provides the best alternative account of the normative character of perceptual experience. |
Abstract
Abstract The idea that our perceptual openness to the world is normative can mean different things. In the Kantian tradition, it is tied to epistemic justification—to our readiness to provide reasons for our actions and our beliefs. In the phenomenological tradition of Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, the notion of norm-responsiveness relevant to perceptual experience has more to do with perception’s capacity to guide action or elicit certain behaviours. While both camps agree on the connection between perceptual consciousness and self-consciousness, there is disagreement about the nature of this relation. At stake are two conceptions of intentionality: the first is understood as a cognitive disposition that concerns our conceptual capacity to represent what there is; the second is bodily informed and includes the set of motor activities relevant for orienting and guiding perception. This chapter argues that the phenomenological model provides the best alternative to account for the normative character of perception.