Nonpositional Consciousness and the Form of Thinking: Kant and Boyle on Self-Consciousness
Canadian Journal of Philosophy April 1, 2025 DOI: 10.1017/can.2025.10021 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Boyle's Sartrean account of prereflective self-awareness provides tools for reinterpreting Kant's 'I think' but risks fragmenting the unity of the subject, which Kant's account can address. |
Abstract
Abstract In Transparency and Reflection , Matthew Boyle offers a Sartrean account of prereflective self-awareness to explain the essential link between self-consciousness and rationality, moving away from standard Kantian interpretations that he claims presuppose rather than explain this connection. I argue that Boyle’s account provides useful tools for re-interpreting Kant’s claim that the “I think” must accompany all representations as a form of nonpositional consciousness. I also aim to show that Boyle’s model risks fragmenting the unity of the subject across different representational domains, and that Kant’s account (construed as a kind of prereflective consciousness) has the resources to address this challenge.