Nonpositional Consciousness and the Form of Thinking: Kant and Boyle on Self-Consciousness

A philosophical paper examines Matthew Boyle's account of prereflective self-awareness from his book Transparency and Reflection, which links self-consciousness to rationality through a Sartrean lens rather than standard Kantian interpretations. The author argues that Boyle's framework offers tools for reinterpreting Kant's claim that the "I think" must accompany all representations as a form of nonpositional consciousness. However, the author contends that Boyle's model risks fragmenting the unity of the subject across different representational domains, and that Kant's own account, understood as a kind of prereflective consciousness, has resources to address this challenge.

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Abstract

Abstract In Transparency and Reflection , Matthew Boyle offers a Sartrean account of prereflective self-awareness to explain the essential link between self-consciousness and rationality, moving away from standard Kantian interpretations that he claims presuppose rather than explain this connection. I argue that Boyle’s account provides useful tools for re-interpreting Kant’s claim that the “I think” must accompany all representations as a form of nonpositional consciousness. I also aim to show that Boyle’s model risks fragmenting the unity of the subject across different representational domains, and that Kant’s account (construed as a kind of prereflective consciousness) has the resources to address this challenge.