Subjective Validity, Self-Consciousness and Inner Experience: Comments on Kraus
Janum Sethi
Kantian Review September 1, 2022 DOI: 10.1017/s1369415422000188 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that Kraus misreads Kant on three points: consciousness of subjectively valid representations is consciousness of one's own perceptions and matters more to self-consciousness than Kraus allows; Kant also admits a merely empirical unity of apperception, in principle distinct from transcendental unity; and Kraus's suggestion that we can be aware of the activity of thinking through inner sense is doubtful. |
Abstract
Abstract: I raise three related objections to aspects of Katharina Kraus’s interpretation in Kant on Self-Knowledge and Self-Formation. First, I reject her claim that representations count as merely subjectively valid for Kant if they represent objects from the contingent perspective of a particular subject. I argue that Kant in fact describes consciousness of subjectively valid representations as consciousness of one’s own perceptions rather than of the objects perceived, and therefore that it plays a bigger role in his account of self-consciousness than Kraus allows. Second, whereas Kraus argues that the transcendental unity of apperception structures the content of any consciousness that is possible for a subject, I note that Kant also allows for a merely empirical unity of apperception, which he describes as in principle different from transcendental unity. Finally, I raise some worries for Kraus’s suggestion that we can be aware of the activity of thinking through inner sense.