The (haunted) brain and consciousness
Oxford University Press eBooks March 12, 1992 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198522379.003.0005 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Qualitative Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 23 |
| Key points | Argues that consciousness as first-person phenomenal experience cannot be studied scientifically, but that a functionalist conception, mainly equivalent to monitoring, can be studied and may allow progress on consciousness's causal role. The author is sceptical of a causal role for phenomenal consciousness and holds that the monitoring function is not unitary and cannot be defined in objective time. |
Abstract
This chapter accepts the subjective qualitative aspect of phenomenal experience as valid, but takes radically different positions on its place in psychology. It specifies three types of usage of the term consciousness and asks in what terms science can study consciousness. It maintains that it cannot be studied as first person phenomenal experience; but that it can be studied within functionalism. In this context, it is to be taken mainly as equivalent to monitoring. This function, however, is not unitary: it can be split. Nor can it be defined in objective time. The chapter expresses a sceptical view about a causal role for consciousness, if understood as phenomenal experience, though it concludes that one can make progress on its causal role if consciousness is taken in functionalist terms.
Citations in the library
Cited by 4
- Hermeneutic Neurophenomenology in the Science-Religion Dialogue: Analysis of States of Consciousness in the Zohar Religions March 6, 2015
- Consciousness and Aphasia 2009
- Introspective physicalism as an approach to the science of consciousness. Cognition April 2001
- Defining the states of consciousness. Neuroscience and biobehavioral reviews March 2001