Consciousness in science and philosophy: conscience and con-science
Richard L Gregory
Oxford University Press eBooks March 12, 1992 DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198522379.003.0012 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 6 |
| Key points | Argues that recourse to the brain may solve the problem of knowing another person's private phenomenal experience, suggesting that mind language is reducible to brain language and that representing a brain state could permit reconstruction of phenomenal experience. A personal account of progressive anaesthesia is used to illustrate what losing particular phenomenal experiences is like, and the author proposes that consciousness phenomena could be tied to functional brain mechanisms once suitable techniques exist. |
Abstract
This chapter explains that recourse to the brain is a possible solution to the old problem of whether it is conceivable that a person could know another person's private phenomenal experience. It gives the provocative suggestion that mind language is reducible to brain language and that the representation of a brain state will permit the reconstruction of phenomenal experience. This chapter provides a most interesting personal account of changes in phenomenal experience under progressive anaesthesia. What is interesting about this tracing of an altering state of consciousness is that we can get some glimpse of what it is like to lose particular phenomenal experiences. Finally, this chapter implies that if we developed the necessary techniques we could relate these phenomena of consciousness to particular functional brain mechanisms.