The Mind-Body Problem
Leibowitz or God's Absence February 1, 1992 DOI: 10.1176/ajp.149.2.280 (opens in new tab) via Semantic Scholar
Summary
AI-generated from the abstractThe hard problem of consciousness is the difficulty of explaining why and how physical brain states give rise to subjective, phenomenal experience. The text questions whether this problem truly exists, arguing that whether an explanatory gap appears depends on which bridge laws one accepts as brute—for example, conceptual necessities or logical laws. If certain bridge laws are taken as given, the gap may disappear; if not, it remains. The authors present Block's argument that even if a specific neural oscillation correlates with consciousness, no concepts explain why that oscillation produces a particular conscious state or any conscious state at all. Van Gulick raises the concern of whether phenomenal properties can be a priori deduced from neural descriptions.
Study at a glance
| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Keywords | Psychology Philosophy |
| Key finding | Argues that whether an 'explanatory gap' exists between physical and phenomenal facts depends on which bridge laws one accepts as brute, challenging the assumption that the hard problem is uniquely intractable. |
Abstract
● Consciousness (‘the mind’) and brain states (‘the body’) can seem to be two very different things. Your consciousness has some particular feel (i.e., phenomenal properties). But your brain states seem not to. Similarly, your brain is located in some region of spacetime. But where exactly, one might ask, is the bearer of consciousness? ● On the other hand, consciousness and brain states clearly have something to do with each other! If you get hit in the head, so that your brain states change, then you will feel dizzy. And if you form the conscious desire to take notes, your brain will send impulses to your arm, leading to its movement. There is clearly a correlation between the two phenomena. ● The problem is to explain the correlation. This is said to be hard -and is sometimes called the ‘hard problem’ -because it is hard to envisage a satisfying answer -given that we cannot just identify bridge laws between physical and phenomenal properties. ○ Question: Does this concede too much? Whether there is an ‘explanatory gap’ between different sets of facts depends on what bridge laws one is allowed to take as brute. If conceptual necessities (analyticities) are taken as brute, there is no gap between the fact that Joe is a bachelor and the fact that Joe is an unmarried male. If they are not, then there is. If classical logical laws are taken as brute, then there is no gap between any fact and that snow is white or it isn’t. If they are not, then there is. What bridge laws can be taken as brute, and why those? ● Block: “Consider [the] theory of P[henomenal] consciousness...that a synchronized 35-75 hertz neural oscillation in the sensory areas of the cortex is at the heart of phenomenal consciousness ...[Even if true] no one has produced the concepts that would allow us to explain why such oscillations are the neural basis of one phenomenally conscious state rather than another or why the oscillations are the neural basis of a phenomenally conscious state rather than a phenomenally unconscious one...[H]ow does it explain what it is like...(207-8, my emphasis)?” ● Van Gulick: “[O]ne might be concerned...with whether the phenomenal...properties of a conscious creature's mind can be a priori deduced from a description of the neural properties of its brain processes.”