The Stream of Consciousness: X. A Critique of James's Appendage Theory of Consciousness (First Part)
Imagination Cognition and Personality June 1, 1996 DOI: 10.2190/cj8y-j8d7-1q2x-gjpn (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 16 |
| Key points | Argues that William James's theory of inner awareness, as expressed in The Principles of Psychology, is an "appendage theory": inner awareness of a mental-occurrence instance requires a distinct mental occurrence that has the first as its object. The author contrasts this with the "intrinsic theory," on which every conscious mental-occurrence instance includes immediate awareness of itself in its own structure. |
Abstract
In this two-part article, I present a critique of William James's theory of inner awareness, as this theory finds expression in The Principles of Psychology. By inner awareness, I mean the immediate awareness we have of some of our own mental-occurrence instances. In the case of any mental-occurrence instance, the actual or potential occurrence of an immediate awareness of it is a necessary condition for its qualifying as a state of consciousness. By an appendage theory, I mean one holding that inner awareness involves a distinct mental-occurrence instance that has the respective conscious mental-occurrence instance as its object. The contrasting intrinsic theory holds that every conscious mental-occurrence instance involves in its own structure immediate awareness of itself. James's appendage theory proposes that, normally, the total brain process produces any mental-occurrence instance, which is a basic durational component of the stream of consciousness, and then may produce a component that gives immediate awareness of the first.