The Stream of Consciousness: X. A Critique of James's Appendage Theory of Consciousness (First Part)

Abstract

In this two-part article, I present a critique of William James's theory of inner awareness, as this theory finds expression in The Principles of Psychology. By inner awareness, I mean the immediate awareness we have of some of our own mental-occurrence instances. In the case of any mental-occurrence instance, the actual or potential occurrence of an immediate awareness of it is a necessary condition for its qualifying as a state of consciousness. By an appendage theory, I mean one holding that inner awareness involves a distinct mental-occurrence instance that has the respective conscious mental-occurrence instance as its object. The contrasting intrinsic theory holds that every conscious mental-occurrence instance involves in its own structure immediate awareness of itself. James's appendage theory proposes that, normally, the total brain process produces any mental-occurrence instance, which is a basic durational component of the stream of consciousness, and then may produce a component that gives immediate awareness of the first.