How access-consciousness might be a kind of consiousness
Behavioral and Brain Sciences June 1, 1995 DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x00038371 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 2 |
| Key points | Describes an objection to Block's "access-consciousness"—that it is really only the availability of information for certain kinds of processing, not consciousness—and anticipates that Block will probably need to argue that a more basic, traditional sense of consciousness is an essential part of every instance of access-consciousness. |
Abstract
Abstract In response to the objection that his “access-consciousness” is not really consciousness but a matter of the availability of certain information for certain kinds of processing, Block will probably have to argue that consciousness in a more basic, familiar, traditional sense is an essential component of any instance of access-consciousness and thus justifies the name.
Citations in the library
Cites 7
- Consciousness in Contemporary Science Oxford University Press eBooks March 12, 1992
- Sensations: A Defense of Type Materialism. The Philosophical Review October 1, 1993
- What is wrong with appendage theory of consciousness Philosophical Psychology 1993
- Lovely and Suspect Ideas Philosophy and Phenomenological Research December 1, 1993
- Sensations January 25, 1991
and 2 more in the library