Access denied
Dan Edward Lloyd
Behavioral and Brain Sciences June 1, 1995 DOI: 10.1017/s0140525x00038346 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 1 |
| Key points | Argues that access consciousness is not sufficient for a representational state to be conscious, that examples of unconscious computation undercut access consciousness as a form of consciousness, and that Block's cases appear plausible only because of a lurking phenomenal awareness. Proposes that minded systems have access consciousness only when the state accessed, the resulting state, or both are phenomenal. |
Abstract
Abstract The information processing that constitutes accessconsciousness is not sufficient to make a representational state conscious in any sense. Standard examples of computation without consciousness undermine A-consciousness, and Block's cases seem to derive their plausibility from a lurking phenomenal awareness. That is, people and other minded systems seem to have access-consciousness only insofar as the state accessed is a phenomenal one, or the state resulting from access is phenomenal, or both.