Do No Harm: the Extended Mind Model and the Problem of Delayed Damage
March 11, 2016 DOI: 10.1007/s11841-016-0515-3 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that philosophy can cause concealed, delayed harm through an assumption of non-violence embedded in working models. The author contends that extended mind theses, as developed by Andy Clark and others, rely on engineering, tool, and function-based models that seek smoothness and transparency, and that—following Kim Sterelny—these claims conceal underlying conflict in the situations they describe. This concealment, the author argues, harms by diminishing capacities to flourish in a given environment. |
Abstract
I argue in this essay that there can be harm due to philosophy that is not directly expressed in violent imagery. The harm is instead a concealed and delayed detrimental effect of an assumption of non-violence in a working model, defined as a picture of a field of enquiry and the methods required to approach it. Theses for the extended mind, as developed by Andy Clark and others, lead to a form of harm that follows from the models they work with. These engineering, tool and function-based models seek smooth interactions and transparency. Following points made by Kim Sterelny in the philosophy of biology, I argue that claims for smoothness and transparency conceal underlying conflict in the situations they seek to describe and explain. This concealment leads to harm, defined as a diminishing of our capacities to flourish in a given environment.