Extended Mind and the Law: Legal Ontology, Social Relations, and the Perils of Parity
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AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that the Extended Mind Thesis, while perhaps metaphysically defensible, should not be applied to law: doing so commits a legal category mistake, neglects interpersonal and social effects, and conflicts with human rights law's protection of the person against objectification and commodification. |
Abstract
According to the Extended Mind Thesis, one of the most discussed philosophical theses of the 21st century, the human mind may extend beyond skin and skull into the world, and especially into tools that perform information processing such as notebooks and smartphones. This reconceptualization of the mind and its material carriers may have intriguing legal implications. It could expanden the scope of rights, modify established doctrines and the category of the person, and necessitate reconsiderations of entrenched legal assumptions, such as there being a distinction between imprisoning a person and interfering with their minds more directly. This chapter analyzes – and ultimately rejects – the applicability of the Extended Mind Thesis to the law. While it may have metaphysical merits, the law is not committed to metaphysics. Applying the Extended Mind Thesis to the law tends to commit a legal category mistake, fails to consider interpersonal and social effects, and ultimately runs counter to one of the cornerstones of human rights law: the exalted protection of the person against objectification and commodification.