The extended mind hypothesis: an anti-metaphysical vaccine
Giorgio Airoldi
Sofia September 5, 2019 DOI: 10.47456/sofia.v8i1.23751 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Key points | Argues that the extended-mind hypothesis is most valuable not as a theory of the mind's a-priori constitution but as a corrective to persistent metaphysical assumptions about the mind's structure, functions, and borders, shifting philosophical focus from ontology to pragmatics. |
Abstract
Discussions about the extended mind have ‘extended’ in various directions in the last decades. While applied to other aspects of human cognition and even consciousness, the extended-mind hypothesis has also been criticized, as it questions fundamental ideas such as the image of a dual world, divided between an external and an internal domain by the border of ‘skin and skull’, the idea of a localized and constant decision center, and the role of internal representations. We suggest that the main virtue of the hypothesis is not as a theory per se, but as a vaccine against persistent metaphysical prejudices about the mind’s structure, functions and borders. Being an hypothesis about the most efficient ways to combine resources and problems, and not a theory about the mind’s a-priori constitution, the extended mind view moves the focus from ontology to pragmatics and helps purify philosophy of mind from metaphysical remainders.