Does Mary know I experience plus rather than quus? A new hard problem
P. Goff
September 1, 2012 DOI: 10.1007/s11098-011-9715-4 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Topics | Philosophy of mind |
| Key points | Argues that physicalism about cognitive phenomenology is extremely difficult to sustain: if consciousness is constitutively realized by what is inside the head, the content of cognitive phenomenology cannot be explained by externalist accounts, and internalist accounts are especially vulnerable to Kripkensteinian rule-following worries, such as whether a state grounds 'straight' rather than 'quus-like' content. |
Abstract
Realism about cognitive or semantic phenomenology, the view that certain conscious states are intrinsically such as to ground thought or understanding, is increasingly being taken seriously in analytic philosophy. The principle aim of this paper is to argue that it is extremely difficult to be a physicalist about cognitive phenomenology. The general trend in later 20th century/early 21st century philosophy of mind has been to account for the content of thought in terms of facts outside the head of the thinker at the time of thought, e.g. in terms of causal relations between thinker and world, or in terms of the natural purposes for which mental representations have developed. However, on the assumption that consciousness is constitutively realised by what is going on inside the head of a thinker at the time of experience, the content of cognitive phenomenology cannot be accounted for in this way. Furthermore, any internalist account of content is particularly susceptible to Kripkensteinian rule following worries. It seems that if someone knew all the physical facts about what is going on in my head at the time I was having a given experience with cognitive phenomenology, they would not thereby know whether that state had ‘straight’ rather than ‘quus-like’ content, e.g. whether the experience was intrinsically such as the ground the thought that two plus two equals four or intrinsically such as to ground the thought that two quus two equals four. The project of naturalising consciousness is much harder for realists about cognitive phenomenology.
Comparable studies
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| The phenomenology of deep brain stimulation-induced changes in OCD: an enactive affordance-based model. | 2013 | Theoretical or philosophical paper | |
| Looking for the Self: Phenomenology, Neurophysiology and Philosophical Significance of Drug-induced Ego Dissolution | 2017 | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
Citations in the library
Cited by 6
- Conscious thinking and cognitive phenomenology: topics, views and future developments Philosophical Explorations May 3, 2016
- The rational role of experience Inquiry October 13, 2017
- Does Cognitive Phenomenology Support Dualism? Canadian Journal of Philosophy July 1, 2023
- Fenomenologia cognitiva Quaderns de Filosofia November 17, 2017
- Non-physicalist Theories of Consciousness January 31, 2024
and 1 more in the library