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Does Cognitive Phenomenology Support Dualism?

Bradford Saad

Canadian Journal of Philosophy July 1, 2023 DOI: 10.1017/can.2024.26 (opens in new tab)

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper Peer reviewed
Topics Philosophy of mind
Key points Argues that dualism's plausibility is sensitive to the truth of cognitive phenomenal realism, and that if cognitive phenomenal realism is true, it supports dualism via a cognitive knowledge argument that offers several advantages over the standard sensory knowledge argument.

Abstract

Abstract Dualism holds that experiences and physical states are distinct in that neither sort of state is identical with or grounded in the other. Cognitive phenomenal realism holds that cognitive experiences are irreducible to sensory experiences. While dualism and cognitive phenomenal realism are logically orthogonal and usually discussed separately, I argue that dualism’s plausibility is sensitive to whether cognitive phenomenal realism is true. In particular, I argue that if cognitive phenomenal realism is true, then it bolsters the case for dualism via a cognitive knowledge argument that has several advantages over the standard sensory knowledge argument.

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