Preliminaries
May 23, 2018 DOI: 10.4324/9781315396347-2 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Theoretical or philosophical paper |
|---|---|
| Citations | 1 |
| Key points | Argues that phenomenal consciousness—the feature of mental states such that there is something it is like to undergo them—is somehow valuable, and proposes that philosophers should clarify the diverse experiential field through distinctions, taxonomies, or accounts of its architecture. |
Abstract
In this chapter, the author examines the thought that phenomenal consciousness is somehow valuable. Consciousness is polysemous. One way to get a sense of this is to read the entry for &s;consciousness&s; in the Oxford English Dictionary. The kind at issue is what philosophers and psychologists call &s;phenomenal consciousness.&s; In the philosophy and science of consciousness psychologists say that phenomenal consciousness is a feature or aspect of mental states, events, and processes. The feature or aspect is that there is something it is like for philosophers to token or undergo these mental states, events, and processes. Faced with the diversity present within the experiential field, one might hope the philosopher will have a way of carving up the field in some way – drawing illuminating distinctions, constructing taxonomies of various types of conscious experience, offering a way to get some grip on the architecture of this unwieldy phenomenon.