Questioning Tononi’s “Information Integration” Theory of Consciousness
Gerard Marx, Chaim Gilon
Acta Scientific Neurology June 1, 2023 DOI: 10.31080/asne.2023.06.0632 (opens in new tab)
Study at a glance
AI-extracted from the abstract| Characteristics | Commentary Peer reviewed |
|---|---|
| Citations | 2 |
| Key points | Argues that consciousness cannot be measured or observed in the way physics and neuroscience typically require, and contends that binary "demotive" algorithms proposed by computer scientists cannot code emotive states. The author questions Tononi's "Information Integration" theory of consciousness on these grounds. |
Abstract
The ambition of modern neuroscientists is to analyze natural phenomena with testable/observable descriptions.But the biologic phenomenon of "consciousness" is overlooked by physicists as it cannot be objectively measured/observed.Computer scientists suggest "demotive" binary algorithms, that are inadequate to code for emotive states.Tononi, a psychiatrist and neuroscientist, presents 22 Questioning Tononi's "Information Integration" Theory of Consciousness
Citations in the library
Cites 7
- Consciousness as Integrated Information: a Provisional Manifesto Biological Bulletin December 1, 2008
- Addressing Searle’s “Problem of Consciousness” International Journal of Psychiatry Research December 30, 2021
- Considerations of Consciousness and Emotive Memory Journal of Psychology and Neuroscience July 5, 2021
- Problems with theories that equate consciousness with information or information processing. Frontiers in Systems Neuroscience November 25, 2014
- Quantum effects in the understanding of consciousness. Journal of Integrative Neuroscience June 1, 2014
and 2 more in the library