The Problem with Phi: A Critique of Integrated Information Theory

Integrated Information Theory (IIT) claims consciousness equals integrated information (Φ). This paper argues IIT fails to quantify consciousness. The main theoretical support for IIT, the principle of information exclusion, lacks justification. Empirical claims for IIT are challenged by constructing a trivial theory with equal explanatory power. Philosophical arguments from mind and epistemology show IIT, not being computational functionalism, is vulnerable to fading and dancing qualia arguments. The phenomenological approach underlying IIT has limitations, making IIT a theory of protoconsciousness rather than consciousness.

Study at a glance

Abstract

Summary In the last decade, Guilio Tononi has developed the Integrated Information Theory (IIT) of consciousness. IIT postulates that consciousness is equal to integrated information (F). The goal of this paper is to show that IIT fails in its stated goal of quantifying consciousness. The paper will challenge the theoretical and empirical arguments in support of IIT. The main theoretical argument for the relevance of integrated information to consciousness is the principle of information exclusion. Yet, no justification is given to support this principle. Tononi claims there is significant empirical support for IIT, but this is called into question by the creation of a trivial theory of consciousness with equal explanatory power. After examining the theoretical and empirical evidence for IIT, arguments from philosophy of mind and epistemology will be examined. Since IIT is not a form of computational functionalism, it is vulnerable to fading/ dancing qualia arguments. Finally, the limitations of the phenomenological approach to studying consciousness are examined, and it will be shown that IIT is a theory of protoconsciousness rather than a theory of consciousness.