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Is Consciousness Computable? Quantifying Integrated Information Using Algorithmic Information Theory

Phil Maguire, Philippe Moser, Rebecca Maguire, Virgil Griffith

arXiv Preprint Archive May 1, 2014 preprint

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AI-extracted from the abstract
Characteristics Theoretical or philosophical paper
Keywords Cs.it Q-bio.nc
Key points Argues that complete lossless integration of information requires noncomputable functions, implying unitary consciousness cannot be modeled computationally.

Abstract

In this article we review Tononi's (2008) theory of consciousness as integrated information. We argue that previous formalizations of integrated information (e.g. Griffith, 2014) depend on information loss. Since lossy integration would necessitate continuous damage to existing memories, we propose it is more natural to frame consciousness as a lossless integrative process and provide a formalization of this idea using algorithmic information theory. We prove that complete lossless integration requires noncomputable functions. This result implies that if unitary consciousness exists, it cannot be modelled computationally.

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